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Abstract An open problem in AI is the definition of meaningful information 
processing. That human interpretation and information processing by current 
computers can be different is well illustrated by Searle’s famous Chinese room 
argument thought experiment. In this paper we suggest that an answer to the above 
open problem of AI can be given by introducing a model of information processing 
which is embedded in a Peircean theory of (meaningful) signs. Peirce’s sign theory, 
that he systematically derived from his concept of a category, is seen by many as a 
theory of the knowable (the types of distinctions that can be signified by signs). We 
show that our model of information processing has the potential for representing 
three types of relation that are analogous to Peirce’s three classifications of sign, 
consisting of 10, 28, and 66 elements.  
Keywords information, human processing, Searle, sign theory, Peirce, process 
model 
1  Introduction 
In his famous Chinese room argument thought experiment (CRA), Searle has shown 
that computations by current computers can be qualitatively less meaningful than 
human interpretation. We may ask: Is it possible to model human interpretation as a 
process?  In this paper we suggest that the answer can be positive. Following the 
assumption that interpretation is related to a goal hence a process, we show that on 
the basis of an analysis of stimulus–reaction phenomena a model of human 
interpretation can be defined as a process (learning is beyond our current scope). By 
associating the events of that process with Peircean sign aspects we establish a 
relation between our model and Peirce’s theory of signs and interpretation. It is by 
virtue of this relation that we can posit our process as a model of meaningful 
information processing. Our process oriented approach may be interesting from a 
semiotic perspective as well. Indeed, by offering an informational analysis to our 
model we are able to show its potential for a representation of three types of relation, 
consisting of 10 (‘meaningful’), 28 (‘syntactic’), and 66 (‘semantic’) classes, which 
are analogous to Peirce’s three classifications of sign.  
2 
The possibility of a process model of human interpretation may enable a 
paradigmatic change in human–computer interfacing. As Peirce’s sign theory is seen 
by many as a theory of the knowable (the types of distinctions that can be signified 
by signs), our model may facilitate the introduction of a novel approach in 
knowledge representation, natural language modeling, and problem specification. 
The possibility of a common representation for Peirce’s different classifications may 
open new perspectives in sign theoretical research as well (Weiss & Burks, 1945), 
(Farias & Queiroz, 2003), (Burch, 2011), (Sanders, 1970). 
The model suggested in this paper, and the relation between the used 
representation and Peirce’s sign aspects has been introduced earlier in (Sarbo, 
Farkas, & van Breemen, 2011), amongst others. The goal of this paper is to show that 
our model is able to represent the more complex concepts of Peircean sign theory as 
well. 
In past research, we experimentally tested that our theory is in line with human 
interpretation. To this end we developed models of information processing in 
different knowledge domains, such as the domain of natural language, ‘naive’ logic, 
and ‘naive’ reasoning. The test results showed that concepts generated by these 
models may be meaningful from a human perspective, as well. 
Our theory is remotely related to Situation Calculus (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969). 
In our model, situations are represented by percepts (cf. sets of perceived qualities), 
fluents by elements of a percept, actions by relations between qualities (cf. bindings). 
Formulae used in action preconditions are restricted to Boolean expressions. 
Note that ‘meaningful information’ (Vitanyi, 2006) and ‘meaningful information 
processing’ are not the same. The first is related to Shannon information1 and a 
distinction between useful regularity and redundancy (Adriaans, 2009), the second to 
information as stimulus and interpretation by the mind. Maybe the negligence of this 
difference explains to some extent the blind spot which information scientists have 
had in their approach to the importance of embedding information processing in a 
theory of signs. Curiously, in information theory the term meaningful may refer to a 
formal property, but also to a property of (human) processing. An example of the 
second is the Turing Test, which assumes the existence of an observer, capable of 
(re)cognizing intelligent hence meaningful communication. Notably the same 
concept is involved in Shannon’s concept of information as event probability, as 
well. Whereas the concept of probability is usually formally defined, not so the 
concept of an event which is related to conceptualization (how can we know that an 
event has occurred) hence to meaningfulness from an interpreter’s perspective. As 
knowledge may arise from (meaningful) interpretation through generalization, 
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 Following (Adriaans et al., 2010), Shannon information can be used to find an optimal 
compression for a sequence of messages. The related concept, Kolmogorov complexity can be 
used to define an ‘optimal’ probability distribution for a binary string: the universal distribution. 
Kolmogorov complexity and Shannon information seem to be dual notions: the shortest code for 
a binary string in the sense of Kolmogorov complexity is it’s optimal code in the sense of 
Shannon information using the universal distribution. 
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limitations caused by a lack of semiotic embedding may characterize traditional, 
formal knowledge representation too.  
The structure of this paper is the following. In Sect. 2, we introduce a model of 
information processing on the basis of an analysis of action–reaction phenomena. 
This is followed by an analysis of our model, from a ‘syntactic’, and a ‘semantic’ 
point of view, in Sect. 3–5. In Sect. 6 we elaborate on the relation between our model 
and Peirce’s different classifications of sign. We close the paper with a summary. 
2  Action–reaction phenomena 
We assume that the goal of human interpretation is the generation of a response to 
(external) stimuli.2 On a physical level, stimuli appear as forces. A theory of forces 
can be found in Newton’s work (Newton, 1999/1687). In his 3rd law of motion he 
postulates: “For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction”. An illustrative 
example is a nail, hit by a hammer. Following Newton’s 2nd law, the applied force 
accelerates the nail much harder, by virtue of its smaller mass, than the reaction force 
accelerates the hammer. In the end, the nail may get deeply driven into the 
underlying piece of timber, while the hammer only gets slightly bounced back in the 
opposite direction. Newton’s 3nd law, in combination with the 2nd law, not only 
predicts the reaction force, but, in specific cases, also the possible consequences of 
the action, such as the driving of the nail. Remarkably, in Newton’s world, there are 
only action–reaction phenomena. This may explain why in everyday life the term 
reaction ambiguously denotes a force as well as the effects triggered by that force. 
From the point of view of information processing, Newton’s model of action–
reaction phenomena may be conceived as too narrow: by knowing the applied force 
and the existing mass, everything else can be computed. Being neutral to the 
direction of time, this monadic model lacks the notion of a development, for 
instance, from action to reaction. See Fig. 1(a). 
 
Figure 1: A monadic (a), dyadic (b), and triadic (c) concept of action–reaction 
phenomena. A dashed line is used to express a dependency between events. A pair of 
nodes that can be merged into a single node is indicated by a dotted circle 
If we are interested in the way in which reactions arise from actions, we may 
introduce the hypothesis that, in everyday phenomena, action and reaction are related 
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 The theory of this section is based on (Sarbo et al., 2011). 
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to each other according to a relation of dependency. Assuming, for the moment, 
causal dependency, the result is a dyadic concept of action–reaction phenomena. See 
Fig. 1(b). 
We may further refine our model by assuming that reactions arise from actions 
through an act of interpretation. Indeed, even at the physical level, the ability of 
objects to show different reactions to different actions may be seen as their potential 
for interpreting actions by ‘(re)cognizing’ them and ‘generating’ a reaction. Just as, 
in principle, physical objects involved in action–reaction phenomena must be 
independent (otherwise their co-occurrence cannot appear as a phenomenon), 
interpretation assumes the existence of knowledge about those objects and the 
possible consequence of their co-occurrence. For example, in our running example, 
the nail may be said to interpret the appearing force, by ‘(re)cognizing’ its measure 
and ‘generating’ a counter force, as well as a diametral piercing movement. In sum, 
through the introduction of the concept of interpretation in our triadic model, the 
relation between action and reaction can be split into two relations: one between 
action and corresponding knowledge (recognition) and another between that 
knowledge and a corresponding reaction (generation), see Fig. 1(c).  
With the assumption of an involved dependency between action and reaction, the 
concept of development comes into sight. 
2.1  Knowledge through internal processing 
In Newton’s world, action and reaction are unambiguously related to each other. 
Objects occurring in the Newtonian world simply do not have the potential of 
changing their ‘reaction strategy’. The ‘knowledge’ in the node ‘interpretation’ in 
Fig. 1(c) remains the same. What happens if we extend our focus and include in our 
model objects that do have the potential to acquire knowledge?  
Obviously, Newton’s 3rd law holds for such entities as well. However, the 
potential to generate more complex reactions enables the introduction of more 
refined models of action–reaction phenomena. Through memorization, the 
interpreting system obtains information about occurring action–reaction events that 
may prove useful in later interactions. If the interpreting system has the potential to 
observe itself and to memorize its observations,3 it will be able to distinguish 
information about external actions from the possible consequences those actions can 
bring about to the interpreting system. The latter kind of information may be called 
the system’s knowledge about itself. Through abstraction and generalization, the 
interpreting system may introduce concepts that can favorably be used to predict the 
consequences that appearing external qualities may have. This potential of the 
interpreting system to predict future events assumes an ability to cope with 
modalities other than the mechanical one, such as wave-type qualities, for instance, 
the observation of light rays in visual action–reaction phenomena: if we see the 
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 An observation is defined as an event interpretation of an interaction. 
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qualities of a hammer moving in our direction, we may step away, or shout, in order 
to prevent certain unfortunate mechanical effects. 
2.2  Two modes of operation 
Arguably, Newton’s theory considers action–reaction phenomena from the point of 
view of an external observer (external-view). If we are interested in the question of 
how interpretation may capitalize on memorized information for the generation of 
reactions, we must switch perspective and analyze action–reaction phenomena from 
the stance of the interpreting system itself (internal-view). Following this stance, we 
suggest that the interpreting system occurring in some state is in interaction with the 
external force (quality).4 This external force appears as an effect in the interpreting 
system. The qualities of this state and effect will be called the input state and effect 
qualities or, briefly, input qualities. The relation between this state and effect is the 
ground for the reaction generated by the observer. 
   
Figure 2: Informational relation underlying interpretation (a), matching mode operation 
(b), and analysis mode operation (c). A continuous line is used to represent a flow of 
emerging information, not just a dependency. ‘K’ stands for the observer’s knowledge 
The aforementioned interaction is stored by the interpreting system in a 
collection of (unanalyzed) ‘input’, ‘state’, ‘effect’ and (interrelated) ‘state–effect’ 
qualities. These ‘storing events’, which come down to establishing relations, are all 
triggered by the external force (‘action’). Interpretation can be successful only if 
these events consistently match memorized information. This informational relation 
underlying the generation of reactions is depicted in Fig. 2(a). A schematic model of 
the corresponding ‘matching’ mode operation of information processing is depicted 
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 External-view representation is possible also in this case. By considering the external force to be 
a representation of a phenomenon, the observer may be able to derive hypotheses about the 
qualities of that phenomenon. 
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in Fig. 2(b). For example, the ‘state’ can be defined by the mass and the velocity of 
the nail and the hammer, the ‘effect’ by the change in their velocities. 
Note that all ‘storing events’ included in Fig. 2(b) are internal. They are related to 
the occurring action and reaction, which are external. The latter relations are 
expressed by means of dashed lines, connecting the nodes ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ via 
the nodes ‘input’, ‘state’, ‘effect’ and ‘state-effect’ relation, refining our model in the 
node ‘interpretation’, in Fig. 1(c).  
We assume that, through generalization, perceived data obtained in past 
experiences may be transformed into knowledge. In the case of indeterminate input 
qualities the generation of a state–effect relation may require an analysis of all 
possible matches, e.g., in a cyclic fashion,5 as well as the selection of a solution, on 
the basis of some strategy. As part of this analysis, different interpretations of the 
input state (cf. ‘state’) and effect (cf. ‘effect’) as well as their relation (cf. ‘state-
effect’) can be generated internally by means of the system’s knowledge about 
corresponding state and effect qualities. 
Following the above considerations, a model of action–reaction phenomena can 
be derived as follows. By considering the input state and effect qualities to be 
external (cf. effect), in relation to the system’s knowledge which is internal (cf. 
state), the interaction between the state and effect qualities on the one hand, and the 
system’s knowledge on the other can be modeled by two instances of a ‘matching’ 
mode process. As the observer’s knowledge is shared by those process instances, it 
can be represented by a single node (‘K’). In Fig. 2(c) the two sub-processes 
(represented by a pair of structures consisting of four nodes) are marked by the labels 
state and effect. Note that the above ‘internal’ refinement of our model (in the nodes 
‘state’ and ‘effect’, in Fig. 2(b)) does not affect the dependency between ‘action’ and 
‘reaction’ (cf. dashed lines).6 In Fig. 2(c), the nodes between ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ 
represent the nine types of relation involved in action–reaction phenomena. 
By the introduction of analysis and selection in the interpretation process, the 
possibility of anticipatory responses and habit formation are added to the mechanistic 
Newtonian model.  
3  Informational analysis 
What information is necessary for the nine types of relation of our model of action–
reaction phenomena?  Following the analysis presented in the previous section, the 
interpreting system must have information about: 
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  We return to this point in Sect. 5.4. 
6
 In Fig. 2(c), dashed lines connect the nodes ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ with the nodes ‘state’ and 
‘effect’ comprised by the two sub-processes, respectively. The labels of the latter two nodes are 
omitted in the diagram. 
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1. Potential relational properties of qualities involved in an input interaction (in 
order to  be able to perceive the input as a co-occurrence of a state and effect) 
2. Actual relational properties of qualities involved in an observed change (in order 
to be able to interpret co-occurring state and effect qualities as ‘constituents’ of a 
relation) 
3. Properties of relations involved in an observed phenomenon (in order to be able 
to interpret the input as a relation between a perceived state and effect). 
For instance, that a nail and a hammer have kinetic properties, which are a 
potential for a relation (1), that a nail can be in relation with a hammer by resisting 
its effect, and a hammer can be in relation with a nail by affecting its state (2), and 
that a nail and a hammer having certain kinetic properties, may establish a relation 
between a diametral force and counter force (3). 
How can we know about the three types of information?  The Newtonian world 
can be defined by a set of action–reaction phenomena, which implies that only 
action-reaction phenomena can be observed hence, from an informational stance, 
only relations (3) can be experienced. Actual relational properties (2) must be 
derived from perceived relations (3), and potential properties (1) from those actual 
relational properties (2). The other way round, potential properties (1) must underly 
actual relational properties (2), and those the properties of perceived relations (3). 
For instance, from the experience of a reaction (3), we may derive the existence of a 
relation between a state and effect (2), and from that relation, a co-occurrence of 
certain kinetic qualities (1).  
Information about qualities may enable an interpretation of co-occurring qualities 
as a relation, involved in the observed phenomenon. An example is a co-occurrence 
of a nail and a hammer, interpreted as ‘nail-driving’. Note that interpretation requires 
knowledge about possible co-occurrences of qualities that can be experienced as a 
phenomenon, hence are meaningful. 
The granularity of information may depend on the resolution by the interpreting 
system. In this paper we assume finite resolution and the existence of a mapping of 
qualities, which are a continuum, to discrete values called qualia.7 Below, we use the 
terms quality and qualia interchangeably. 
Postulating the existence of three types of information enables action–reaction 
phenomena to be interpreted as a process, combining qualities involved in an 
interaction into a relation. 
3.1  Categories and types of information 
In this section we will settle on the idea that the three types of information may 
coincide with the three categories of information involved in phenomena. According 
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 Following (Harnad, 1987) we assume qualia to be ‘internal’ representations of ‘external’ 
qualities. Qualia is plural for quale. 
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to Peirce, phenomena can be distinguished in three categories, that he consequently 
called firstness, secondness, and thirdness: 
The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything 
nor lying behind anything. The second is that which is what it is by force 
of something to which it is second. The third is that which is what it is 
owing to things between which it mediates and which it brings into 
relation to each other (Peirce, 1932)8  
An example of firstness are qualities in themselves, e.g., nail, hammer. An 
example of secondness are (ad-hoc) relations between qualities, e.g., a co-occurrence 
of a nail and a hammer. An example of thirdness are habitual (meaningful) relations 
of qualities, e.g., a co-occurrence of a nail and a hammer (known) as ‘nail-driving’. 
Another example, this time in the context of the CRA, is the perception of an input 
string as a quality (cf. firstness), as a sequence of words in some language (cf. 
secondness), and a sentence in a familiar language (cf. thirdness). In the first case, 
the reaction can be a copying of the input (cf. impression), in the second case, the 
generation of a syntactic parsing, in the third case, the establishing of a meaningful 
interpretation. 
The three categories are related to each other according to a relation of 
dependency: categories of a higher ordinal number involve a lower order category. A 
distinguishing property of the Peircean categorical schema is that thirdness can only 
be experienced, firstness may only appear through secondness, and secondness only 
through thirdness.9 This subservience relation of the three categories implies that 
categories of a lower ordinal number evolve to hence need a higher order category. 
The two relations share the property that they are reflexive and transitive. Below we 
refer to the two types of dependency between categories by the relations ‘involve’ 
(‘≥’) and ‘evolve’ (‘≤’).  
We suggest that the three types of information of qualities, introduced in the 
previous section, are analogous to the three classes of a categorical definition of 
information involved in phenomena, as mentioned above: 
1. data: information involved in a quality in itself, such as its potential for a relation 
(cf. firstness) 
2. connection: information involved in a relation of a quality with another quality, 
such as its actual relational properties (cf. secondness) 
3. relation: information involved in a quality, establishing a relation, such as its 
habitual properties (cf. thirdness). 
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 Note the difference with Aristotle’s categories, that are the possible kind of things that can be the 
subject or the predicate of a proposition. 
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By considering the dependency between the Peircean categories to be an 
expression of a development, the three classes of information can be interpreted as 
stages of an informational process, generating a relation (cf. reaction) involved in the 
input action. We assume that information of a higher class involves information of a 
lower class, and the other way around, information of a lower class needs 
information of a higher class it is evolving to. For instance, 1≤2: a potential relational 
property may become operational only through an actual relation; and 3≥2: an arising 
relation involves an actual relation between qualia. An example, in the context of the 
CRA, are the relations involved in the interpreting system’s potential for generating a 
copy of the input (1), for analyzing it syntactically (2), and in a meaningful fashion 
(3). 
By establishing a link between categories and types of information, which are 
relations, we open the way for a relational interpretation of action–reaction 
phenomena. 
4  Relational interpretation 
From a categorical perspective, qualities involved in an interaction must be 
independent (cf. firstness). The reaction, which arises through interpretation, must 
involve a qualitative change (cf. thirdness). From this we may conclude that each one 
of the interacting qualities, and reaction, which too is a quality, must be independent.  
An example of qualities involved in an interaction are a nail and hammer; an 
example of a qualitative change is the arising force and counter force. Another 
example, this time in the domain of wave-type phenomena, are interacting wave 
signals (cf. qualities), and an arising standing wave (cf. a qualitative change). 
From an informational stance, an interaction can be characterized by a pair of 
qualities (q1, q2), the reaction by the quality of the arising force and counter force 
(q3). As information involved in each one of the 3 qualities can be distinguished in 3 
classes (cf. stages), we suggest that information involved in action–reaction 
phenomena can be represented by 3*3*3=27 possible relations or combinations of 
information stages; the arising phenomenon itself by the combination corresponding 
to the ‘arising’ relation (which can be any one of those possible relations). As an 
observation is always related to some perspective by the observer, the ‘arising’ 
relation must involve information about a selection from the 27 combinations. By 
virtue of this information, the ‘arising’ relation must be different from those possible 
relations.  
In sum, we suggest that action–reaction phenomena can be characterized by 
27+1=28 types of relation. According to our model, those relations must be involved 
in the interaction between q1 and q2. Information about the reaction, involved in q3, 
may enable a novel interpretation of the existing relations, but no introduction of 
relations independent from q1 and q2 (the existence of such relations would imply 
that representation by the observer may not be truthful). 
10 
4.1  Internal-view representation 
Although from the point of view of interaction, the observer can be identical to one 
of the interacting qualities, from the stance of interpretation, the observer may 
represent the input interaction from the perspective of any one of the two input 
qualities. The two perspectives of interpretation are: q1 is affecting q2, and q2 is 
affecting q1, that we will call effect-, and state-view, respectively.10 By virtue of the 
isomorphism between the two perspectives, their relations can be merged into a 
single representation. We will return to this point in Sect. 5, in which we incorporate 
in our model a representation of q3, as well.  
Below, we elaborate on an effect-view interpretation (q1 is affecting q2). 
Conform this perspective, the two qualia are interpreted differently: q1 as an 
expression of the input effect, q2 as an expression of a relation of the input state with 
the input effect. The three classes of relational information involved in q2 can be 
defined as follows (see Fig. 3): 
(1) independent: an expression of the relation of q2 with q1, as a co-occurrence of 
independent qualia (cf. firstness) 
(2) co-existing: an expression of the relation of q2 with q1 , as a co-existence of 
interrelated qualia (cf. secondness) 
(3) corresponding: an expression of the relation of q2 with q1, as a correspondence 
of qualia (cf. thirdness). 
Following the dependency between the categories (see Sect. 3.1), the above 
classes are related to one another: (1)≤(2)≤(3) and (3)≥(2)≥(1) where ‘≤’ and ‘≥’ are 
used as polymorphic operators. 
As q2 and q1 are commonly interpreted from the perspective of q1, their 
information can be merged into a single representation. The three up-right diagonals 
depicted in this diagram represent q1 from the perspective of firstness, secondness, 
and thirdness, according to q2, that we call the three representations of q1. The 
terminology used in Fig. 3, as well as below, complies with the terminology used in 
(Sarbo et al., 2011).  
(1) First representation of  q1 according to q2  
neutral=independent∗data: an expression of the input qualia as neutral relational 
 properties or a potential for a relation 
passive=independent∗connection: an expression of the input qualia as passive 
 relational properties enabling an actual relation 
active=independent∗relation: an expression of the input qualia as active relational
 properties involved in a habitual relation  
An example are independent qualia of an interaction appearing as data (cf. neutral); 
the potential of q1 for a relation with an independent other quality, represented by q2 
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(cf. passive); and the habitual properties of a relation involved in q1, in combination 
with a type of qualia represented by q2 (cf. active). 
(2) Second representation of q1 according to q2 
constituent=co-existing∗data: an expression of the input qualia as constituents of 
 a potential relation 
modifier=co-existing∗connection: an expression of the input qualia as passive 
 constituents enabling an actual relation 
predicate=co-existing∗relation: an expression of the input qualia as interrelated 
 active  constituents involved in a habitual relation 
An example, in syntactic language phenomena, are co-existent words of an input 
string, appearing as data (cf. constituent); syntactic modifiers, connecting to their 
arguments (cf. modifier); and verb phrases, predicating the subject of the sentence 
(cf. predicate). 
(3) Third representation of q1 according to q2  
abstract=corresponding∗data: an expression of the input qualia as abstract 
 properties involved in a potential relation 
structure=corresponding∗connection: an expression of the input qualia as 
 interrelated properties involved in an actual relation 
binding=corresponding∗relation: an expression of the input qualia as an 
 amalgamation of properties involved in a habitual relation. 
An example, this time in wave-type phenomena, are corresponding signals of a wave 
phenomenon, abstracted as longitudinal or transversal wave-forms (cf. abstract); a 
combination of wave signals into an interference or superposition (cf. structure); and 
a relation of wave signals, appearing as a standing wave, characterized by an arising 
new wave pattern (cf. binding). 
By combining information from q2 and q1 into a single representation, we lay the 
ground for an informational analysis of our model of action–reaction phenomena. 
 
Figure 3: Combined state and effect information in effect-view interpretation. The 
three up-right diagonals illustrate the three representations of q1 (according to q2) 
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5  Information structures 
The goal of this section is to show that the 27+1 combinations of information stages 
can be represented by relations enabled by q2 and q1. Our model is categorically 
inspired. We show that those relations, as well as the operations generating them, 
exhibit the properties of the three categories. Following this line of thought we 
assume that, from an informational stance, action–reaction phenomena must involve 
ternary relations between three qualities (cf. thirdness), binary relations between a 
pair of qualities (cf. secondness), and unary relations of qualities to themselves (cf. 
firstness). As, in effect-view, the observed phenomenon is represented by 
information involved in q1, in the relation between q2 and q1, and in the relation 
between q3, q2 and q1, we assume that the 27+1 combinations of information stages 
is represented by unary relations of q1 to itself, binary relations between q2 and q1, 
and ternary relations between all three qualities. As q3 is merging q2 and q1 into a 
single quality, we assume that q3 can be represented by merging information 
involved in q2 and q1.  
We suggest that unary, binary, and ternary relations between qualities can be 
represented by relations between stages from a single, a pair of, and all three 
representations of q1, respectively. By virtue of their categorical foundation, relations 
between information stages must respect the dependency between categories. We call 
this the condition of categorical dependency. For example, a secondness category 
information stage can be in an ‘involve’ relation (‘≥’) with firstness and secondness 
category information stage(s) only. Below we begin with an analysis of unary and 
binary relations. We return to ternary relations in Sect. 5.1.3.  
5.1  Syntactic structures 
In order to introduce an informational analysis of our representation, we embed the 
set of stages of a quality into the ordered set of integers S={1,2,3}. For i∈{1,2}, we 
define:  qi =ۃS,≤ۄ. We represent the set of relations enabled by q2 and q1 by the 
operation lattice multiplication (Davey & Priestley,1990). In this section, we restrict 
ourselves to an analysis of the relations represented by the Hasse-diagram of the 
arising ordering,11 that we refer to by the symbol ‘q2*q1’. We allow ‘≤’ to designate 
the relations ‘involve’ and ‘evolve’, ambiguously. We call an element of the set 
underlying q2*q1 a stage.12 A stage of q2*q1 can be referred to by its coordinates 
‘(i)j’, designating stage ‘j’ of q1, from the ‘i’th perspective, according to q2. For 
instance, (3)1 designates stage 1 of q1, from the perspective of 3rdness, according to 
q2. See also Fig. 4. Elements of q2*q1, that are relations, can be referred to by a pair 
of coordinates, separated by a hyphen symbol, for instance, (3)1-(3)2. Reference to a 
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of a closure operation. 
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 Note the ambiguous use of this term. 
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set of relations can be abbreviated. For example, (3)1-(3)2-(2)2 is short for {(3)1-
(3)2, (3)2-(2)2}. 
                           
Figure 4: A representation of q2*q1. Stages of q2*q1 are labelled by a pair of integers, 
representing the category of a stage of q2 (in parentheses) and a stage of q1. Stages of q2 
are used as (relational) representations of a stage of q1. For example, (3)1 designates 
stage 1 of q1, from a 3rdness perspective according to q2. This convention is used in 
later diagrams as well. 
In order to achieve our goal set in the beginning of Sect. 5, we derive decom-
positions of q2*q1. In the case of unary relations (cf. firstness) this boils down to 
decompositions of q1 (Birkhoff & Bartee, 1970). In our categorically inspired 
analysis we restrict ourselves to decompositions that are homogeneous hence can be 
characterized by a single type or category. We define a homogeneous decomposition 
of a relation R, as follows: R=  i=1,k (r i r),  for r⊆R, k≥1, and r i∩r j =∅ for i≠j. The 
equivalence class r is also called a unit relation. By virtue of the two orderings (cf. 
‘involve’ and ‘evolve’), r has two versions. We assume that a single version of r is 
defined by one of the order relations only. In the diagrams of this section, relations 
are represented by undirected edges (information about ordering is omitted). 
In our analysis we always begin with the smallest unit relation of a kind (unary, 
binary, and ternary), from which we develop new unit relations (and decompositions) 
by means of three functions on relations:13 (1) identity, (2) composition, (3) 
recursion. Identity (1) enables a definition of instances of r in R. Composition (2) is a 
function on instances of r. By virtue of the existence of the two order relations, this 
operation has two versions, combination and complementation, enabling a 
composition of instances of r, having identical and different orderings, respectively. 
Finally, recursion (3) enables an introduction of a new interpretation of a relation. 
This function has three versions: transitive closure, encapsulation, and merging. 
Encapsulation enables a subset of R to be interpreted as an element of an ordering. A 
pair of such elements are considered to be in relation if they include a shared element 
of R. Merging introduces a conceptually new interpretation for R.  
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 We specify our functions by means of examples (a formal definition is omitted). 
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Note the categorical nature of the three functions above. Identity operates on a 
singleton relation (cf. firstness), composition on a pair of subsets of a relation (cf. 
secondness), recursion on subsets underlying a new concept (cf. thirdness). Also note 
the analogy between these functions, and the functions used by a mathematical 
theory of categories (Barr & Wells, 1990).  
We call a homogeneous decomposition of R a conceptualization, an instance of r 
an information structure. In our analysis, trivial decompositions (r∈R) are omitted. 
As the structures revealed by our analysis do not represent information involved in 
q3, they can be called syntactic structures.  
An example, in geometry, are the different decompositions of a quadrangle, 
defined by a relation between four points and edges. By considering a point and a 
pair of edges which it is incident to be a single relation (cf. identity), the quadrangle 
can be recursively conceptualized (cf. encapsulation) as a relation between four 
angles (cf. merging). By combining the relations representing a pair of 
complementary angles into a single relation (cf. complementation), the quadrangle 
can be conceptualized as a couple of pairs of angles (Sarbo, 1996).  
5.1.1  Unary structures 
The smallest unary unit relation is defined by the relation of an information stage of 
q1. See Fig. 5(a). The corresponding unary decomposition of q1 is a trivial one. A 
more interesting unit relation can be found through composition and transitive 
closure. See Fig. 5(b). A homogeneous decomposition of the three representations of 
q1 into three unary information structures is depicted in Fig. 5(c). An application of 
both versions of the above unit relation do not enable new conceptualizations, 
different from the existing ones. Unary informations structures satisfy the condition 
of categorical dependency, trivially. 
The number of unary information structures is: 3. 
 
Figure 5: Unit relations enabling a trivial (a), and a non-trivial unary decomposition of 
q1 (b). The three unary information structures (c) generated by unit relation (b). Bullets 
of a lighter grey shade stand for stages of q1 that are closed. Dotted lines are used for an 
expression of the three representations of q1, as firstness category relations involved in 
q2*q1. 
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5.1.2  Binary structures 
The smallest binary unit relation is defined by the pair of relations of an information 
stage of q2*q1. The two versions of this relation are displayed in Fig. 6(a) and 
Fig. 6(b). An instance of the first version is (2)1-(1)1-(1)2. A homogeneous 
decomposition of q2*q1 into binary information structures is depicted in Fig. 7(a), by 
small ‘triangles’.14 Instances of the two versions of the unit relation, ordered by 
‘evolve’ (‘≤’) and ‘involve’ (‘≥’), are represented by ‘triangles’ pointing downward 
and upward, respectively. Through composition (combination and complementation) 
and transitive closure, q2*q1 can be conceptualized as a set of large ‘triangles’. See 
Fig. 7(b). 
 
Figure 6: The two versions of the used binary unit relation, ordered by ‘evolve’ (a) and 
‘involve’ (b). A sample binary information structure (c), and the closure of a composition 
of binary information structures (d). A filling pattern is used for an illustration of binary 
structures as ‘triangles’ 
By combining a pair of small ‘triangles’ into a single relation (cf. 
complementation), we may conceptualize q2*q1 as a set of small ‘quadrangles’. See 
Fig. 8(a). An example is the complementation of (2)1-(1)1-(1)2 by (2)1-(2)2-(1)2, 
obtaining (2)1-(2)2-(1)2-(1)1. Considering small ‘quadrangles’ to be a single 
element, enables q2*q1 to be recursively conceptualized as a large ‘quadrangle’. See 
Fig. 8(b). Binary information structures satisfy the condition of categorical 
dependency, trivially. For example, in Fig. 6(c), (1)1≤(2)1 and (1)1≤(1)2, as (1)≤(2) 
and 1≤1, and (1)≤(1) and 1≤2, respectively. 
The number of binary information structures is: (8+2)+(4+1)= 15. 
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 For reasons, explained later in Sect. 5.1.3, binary information structures are represented by 
triangles. 
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Figure 7: A conceptualization of q2*q1 as small (a) and large ‘triangles’ (b) 
  
Figure 8: A conceptualization of q2*q1 as small (a) and large ‘quadrangles’ (b). Edges 
representing relations arising through closure, are omitted (e.g., in (a), (1)1-(2)2, and in (b), 
(1)1-(3)3) 
5.1.3  Ternary structures 
Ternary relations are relations between q3, q2, and q1. From an analytical perspective, 
q3 (cf. reaction) must involve information about q2 and q1, as well as about itself. 
However, binary relations enabled by q2*q1 may represent information involved in 
q2 and q1 only. We may capture the above completeness of q3, by defining ternary 
relations to include information from all three representations of q1 (according to q2). 
As a result, we may define the smallest ternary unit relation to be a relation between 
a single information stage from each one of the three representations of q1. An 
instance of this unit relation is defined by the information stages (3)1, (2)1, (1)2. 
We represent ternary information structures by triples. To this end, we assume 
the existence of an order preserving mapping between the three categories and the 
three positions of a triple. This way we ensure that, in a triple, the condition of 
categorical dependency for stages from q2 is respected. In addition we require that 
the above condition is respected by the stages of q1, occurring in the three positions 
of a triple. We use the convention that a triple ‘(i,j,k)’ stands for the ternary relation 
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(3)i-(2)j-(1)k, for 1≤ i, j, k ≤3. For example, (1,2,2) is representing (3)1-(2)2-(1)2. 
This relation satisfies the condition of categorical dependency, as 1≤2≤2. An 
example of a triple which does not satisfy that condition is (2,1,1).  
A homogeneous decomposition of q2*q1 into ternary information structures is 
defined by the set: {(1,1,1), (1,1,2), (1,2,2), (2,2,2), (1,1,3), (1,2,3), (2,2,3), (1,3,3), 
(2,3,3), (3,3,3)}, which is a strict lexicographic ordering. See Fig. 9. In this diagram, 
stages occurring in a ternary relation are connected by edges (cf. relations between 
information stages). An application of both versions of the above unit relation, as 
well as the use of the operations, composition and recursion,15 enable no new 
decompositions. Note, in Fig. 9, the existence of ‘horizontal’ edges, e.g., (2)1-(1)2, 
which explains our earlier representation of binary information structures by means 
of triangles, in Fig. 7.  
The number of ternary information structures is: 10.  
 
 
Figure 9: Ternary information structures depicted by edges between stages occurring in the 
three positions of a triple (a). The involved set of relations (b) and ‘horizontal’ 
dependencies (c) 
Following the analysis of this section we conclude that the number of unary, 
binary, and ternary information structures involved in q2*q1 is: (3+15+10)= 28. Note 
the categorical nature of the three types of structures. Unary information structures 
are independent (cf. firstness), binary information structures are related to one 
another, but their relation is not an ordering (cf. secondness), ternary information 
structures are related and their relation defines an induced ordering (cf. thirdness). 
Also note that, from a formal perspective, the set of decompositions of q2*q1 
introduced in this section is not complete. Decompositions that are not mentioned are 
not categorically founded hence are not considered to be representations of action–
reaction phenomena. 
The relations introduced in this section are an expression of a co-existence of 
information stages. As, from an analytical point of view, action–reaction phenomena 
                                                 
15
 Note that the number of values that can be assigned to a position of a triple is 3, which is a 
prime number. 
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merge the qualities of an interaction into a single quality (cf. reaction), we are 
interested in relations expressing a combination of information involved in qualities 
of a phenomenon. An analysis of such relations, represented by q2*q1, is the subject 
of the next section. 
 
Figure 10: Relations in effect- (a) and state-view interpretation (b), and the set of 
relations obtained through merging (c) 
5.2  Semantic structures 
The set of relations generated by the two perspectives of interpretation, q1 is affecting 
q2 (effect-view) and q2 is affecting q1 (state-view), are isomorphic. See Fig. 10(a) 
and Fig. 10(b). Although in a single observation, the observer may develop one of 
the two interpretations only, we assume that through memorization, relations from 
the two perspectives can be merged into a single representation by the observer (this 
requires that one of the two representations is reflected). The arising full set of 
relations is depicted in Fig. 10(c). Note, in this diagram, the existence of an edge 
between (1)1 and (3)3, and the absence16 of one between (3)1 and (1)3. See also 
Fig. 8. 
The potential of the observer to consider phenomena to be interactions between 
some state and effect, is independent from its potential to merge information from 
different interpretations, through memorization. We assume that, in a single 
observation, the observer may develop one of the two possible views of 
interpretation in the presence of memory information too. How can we comply with 
this condition of our model?  
By analyzing the relations, displayed in Fig. 10(c), we may observe that there are 
two relations, (2)1-(3)2 and (1)2-(2)3, which are an expression of a combined growth 
of categorical information involved in q2 and q1 hence can be used for distinguishing 
between two perspectives of interpretation. As (2)1-(3)2 is an expression of an 
increase of information of the state (q2), from secondness to thirdness (this is 
opposed to an increase of information of the effect (q1), from firstness to secondness, 
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 This is a consequence of the ‘V’-shape relations underlying small ‘triangles’ (cf. Sect. 5.1.2). 
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which is less meaningful), this relation can be associated with state-view 
interpretation. For symmetry reasons, (1)2-(2)3, expressing an increase of 
information of the effect, can be associated with effect-view interpretation.17 In sum, 
we assume that ‘state-view’ interpretation is characterized by the presence of (2)1-
(3)2 and the absence of (1)2-(2)3; effect-view interpretation by the presence (1)2-
(2)3 of and the absence of (2)1-(3)2. See Fig. 11. 
By re-introducing the two views of interpretation, the possibility of an analysis of 
relations representing a combination of information from different perspectives 
comes into sight.  
 
  
  Figure 11: Relations in state- (a) and effect-view interpretation (b) 
5.3  Octahedron representation 
In order to expose our relations as an expression of information combination, we 
offer a transformation to our representation, depicted in Fig. 11. We illustrate this for 
state-view interpretation, shown in Fig. 11(a). Relations enabling a combination of 
information from different perspectives of q1 must be relations between stages that 
are categorically different18 (relations between information stages that are different in 
their q2, or q1 coordinates only, have been considered already by our analysis). These 
are the ‘crossing’ relations, (3)2-(1)3, (3)1-(1)2, (2)1-(1)3, (3)1-(2)3, and the 
‘vertical’ relations, (2)1-(3)2, (1)1-(2)2, (2)2-(3)3 and (1)1-(3)3. For example, in 
(3)2-(1)3, (3) and (1), as well as 2 and 3, are categorically different. An example of a 
relation that does not satisfy our needs is (3)2-(2)2. 
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 (1)1-(2)2, (2)2-(3)3, and (1)1-(3)3 do not represent an increase of categorical information 
specific for q2, or q1; (2)1-(1)3, (3)1-(2)3, etc., do not represent a combined growth of 
categorical information of q2 and q1. 
18
 A combination of information from different interpretations is meaningful for binary and 
ternary relations only. 
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An essential element of our transformation is a combination of information from 
a pair of stages of a relation into a single stage. As a result, the edge connecting the 
two stages can be removed. We illustrate our transformation for (3)1-(1)2 and (3)2-
(1)3. Through merging them into (1)2 and (1)3, respectively, information shared by 
the relations (3)1-(2)2 and (3)2-(2)2 may get lost (cf. information ‘coordinated’ by 
(2)2). In order to keep the represented information invariant, we introduce an 
identical copy of (2)2, as shown in Fig. 12(a).19 As (1)1 and (3)3 are in relation with 
(2)2, the relations (1)1-(2)2 and (2)2-(3)3 can be replaced by (1)1-(2)2 and (2)2-(3)3. 
A stepwise transformation of the relations in Fig. 11(a) is illustrated by Fig. 12(b)-
(d). A transformation of the relations in Fig. 11(b) is depicted in Fig. 13. 
 
 
Figure 12: A transformation of relations, in state-view interpretation. In (a)–(c), stages 
and edges involved in merging are given in italics, and by dotted lines, respectively. In 
(d), vertices are labelled by an expression on stages; combination of information is 
designated by ‘_’ . The number of instances of a stage can be given by a superscript, for 
example, (2)33_(3)1 designates a combination of information from 3 instances of (2)3 and 
a single instance of (3)1. Grey shade and dotted lines are used for visualization purposes  
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 A copy is required as coordination may refer to all information represented by (2)2. Note that 
information is idempotent for addition. Stages involved in information combination are given in 
italics, e.g., (2)2. 
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Figure 13: A transformation of relations in effect-view interpretation (a) into an 
octahedron (b) 
5.4  Cyclic information processing 
The category of information obtained through combination can be distinguished in 
two types: ‘and’- and ‘or’-type. For example, firstness type information, designated 
by ‘1’, is ‘and’-type in (1)1, by virtue of occurrences of ‘1’ in both coordinates; and 
‘or’-type in (1)2-(3)1, because of occurrences of ‘1’ in different coordinates. This 
way, vertices of the octahedron can be labelled by their categorical type of 
information. We elaborate this for ‘effect-view’ representation, depicted in Fig. 13. 
In our presentation below, superscripts of a stage are omitted (cf. idempotence of 
information). We represent the categorical type of information of a vertex by an 
expression, in which ‘and’-, and ‘or’-type occurrences of a category are separated by 
a ‘*’, and ‘+’ symbol, respectively. 
(1)1_(2)2_(3)3:   1∗2∗3 
(2)1_(1)3:    1 
(2)3_(1)2:   2 
(3)2_(1)3:   3 
(3)1_(1)2)_(2)3:  1+2+3 
(2)2_(2)2_(2)2_(2)2:  2∗2∗2∗2 
In the case of indeterminate input, the interpreting system may have to consider 
all possible interpretations, one by one, in a cyclic fashion. Cyclic operation can be 
modelled by mapping the vertices of the octahedron to the nodes of our Newtonian 
model of action–reaction phenomena. The vertex labelled by 2*2*2*2 can be 
mapped to the node ‘action’, by virtue of the meaning of a pointer involved in 
secondness (cf. 2) and the potential of the node ‘action’ for a presentation of qualia 
of a (next) input phenomenon. The vertex labelled by 1*2*3 can be mapped to the 
node ‘reaction’, by virtue of the completeness of thirdness20 and the potential of the 
node ‘reaction’ to combine information from all three qualities. The other four 
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 Thirdness involves secondness and firstness. 
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vertices can be mapped to the four nodes of our Newtonian model, as well as to 
stages of q2*q1, as follows. See also Fig. 14. 
1: state, (3)1; abstract input state, representing the potential for a relation with any 
effect (cf. firstness) 
2: state–effect, (3)3; binding, between the input state and effect, representing a 
relation (cf. secondness) 
3: effect, (1)3; abstract input effect, representing the potential for a habitual  relation 
with a type of input state which is involved (cf. thirdness) 
1+2+3: input, (1)1; input state and effect, representing a collection of qualia (cf. 
relational potential) offered for interpretation. 
 
  
Figure 14: A recap of our Newtonian model of interpretation (a), cf. Fig. 2(c), and a 
cyclic process interpretation of the octahedron (b), cf. Fig. 13 (which is clock-wise 
rotated by 90o). In (b), a vertex can be labelled by a stage and a categorical type of 
information separated by a colon symbol 
By transforming our relations into an octahedron and through making use of the 
mapping above, the cutting plane of the octahedron can be interpreted as an instance 
of ‘matching’ mode operation. If the generated relations do not enable this mode of 
operation, the interpreting system may switch to ‘analysis’ mode, in order to generate 
other relations, by means of the interpreting system’s knowledge, eventually 
enabling a matching of the (augmented) input qualia.  
5.5  Relations re-presented 
Our mapping, displayed in Fig. 14(b), reveals the possibility of the cutting plane of 
the next cycle to be ‘primed’ by information from the previous cycle. It also reveals 
the potential of this structure to be interpreted as an instance of q2*q1. Following our 
analysis, in Sect. 5, q2*q1 enables a representation of 28 syntactic structures. 
According to our Newtonian model, those structures must be in relation with the 
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nodes, ‘action’ and ‘reaction’. From these premises we conclude that, through 
considering relations to be expressions of information combination, the octahedron 
structure can be interpreted as a representation of 2*28 structures. By virtue of the 
potential of the nodes, ‘action’ and ‘reaction’, for a representation of properties of the 
interpreting system itself, those structures can be called semantic structures. 
In Sect. 2 we have shown that our Newtonian model can be interpreted as a 
representation of relations between the three qualities involved in action–reaction 
phenomena. The nodes ‘action’, and ‘reaction’, are an expression of this relation as a 
firstness, and a thirdness, respectively; the cutting plane as a representation of the 
same relation as a secondness. By virtue of the dependency between the cutting 
plane, and the nodes ‘action’, and ‘reaction’, the two sets of 28 semantic structures 
(cf. 2*28) can be said to represent a relation between firstness and secondness 
(‘action’–cutting plane), and between secondness and thirdness (cutting plane–
‘reaction’), respectively.  
Earlier we represented ternary relations by syntactic structures (cf. triples), in 
which a position is filled by information from a single perspective of q1 (cf. 
firstness). Later we introduced a representation of ternary relations by semantic 
structures, in which a position is filled by information from a pair of perspectives of 
q1 (cf. secondness). Eventually we define a third type of (triadic) ternary relation, in 
which a position is defined by information from all three perspectives of q1. We 
assume that triadic (‘meaningful’) ternary information structures are in relation with 
the nodes ‘action’ and ‘reaction’, both. As a result we may extend the set of semantic 
structures by 10 triadic structures, one of which representing the ‘arising’ relation 
generated by the interpreting system. 
The number of semantic structures is: 2*28+10= 66.  
  
Figure 15: An overview of the types of relation used by our model 
In summary, relational information is represented by our model in three ways 
(see Fig. 15) by 28 syntactic structures (information from a single representation of 
q1), 2*28 semantic structures (information from a pair of representations of q1), and 
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10 triadic structures (information from all three representations of q1). To this end, 
we introduced three types of relation (unary, binary, ternary), and within that 
classification we made a distinction between three types of representation. Relations 
of the first type represent information stages of a category in themselves (cf. unary, 
binary, ternary relations); relations of the second type are an expression of a 
combination of information from a pair of categories (cf. binary and ternary 
relations); relations of the third type represent a merging of information from all 
three categories (cf. ternary relations). Note that unary relations have a single type, 
binary relations two types, and ternary relations have three types. 
An interesting property of q1*q1 is that its number of elements is 12, enabling a 
definition of 66 pairs (cf. binary relations).21 This may be considered to be an 
expression of the potential of q1*q2 for a formal representation of action–reaction 
phenomena.  
A representation of meaningful interpretation is beyond our possibilities. In line 
with Peircean semiotics, we assume that interpretation22 involves an irreducible 
triadic relation between the three qualities of action–reaction phenomena. This may 
explain why triadic (‘meaningful’) ternary relations have been introduced as a subset 
of semantic relations. 
6  Peircean sign relations 
The goal of this section is to show that our model of action–reaction phenomena is 
congruent with Peirce’s theory of signs. To this end, we generalize the concept of an 
interaction in the concept of a sign, and present action–reaction phenomena as sign 
interpretation processes. 
6.1  Categories, signs, and sign aspects 
Fundamental notions in Peircean theory are his three categories of phenomena: 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. An example of the three categories, in the 
domain of signs, is the quality of pain (firstness), the relation of pain with its object, 
e.g., toothache (secondness), and the relation between pain and its interpreting 
thought by some agent, e.g., “call a dentist” (thirdness).23 
By analyzing his concept of a sign along categorical lines, Peirce concluded that 
all signs must involve nine sign aspects. Note that sign aspects are different from 
signs. They may be characterized as potential signs, that are becoming a sign. This 
difference between signs and sign aspects can be illustrated by the phenomenon of 
apparent motion perception. In this phenomenon, a series of steady pictures (cf. sign 
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 From a semiotic perspective, interpretation is always meaningful. 
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 The relation of the sign with its interpretant involves the relation of the sign with its object. 
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aspect) are presented. Although each picture can be meaningful in itself, combined 
they can be interpreted as parameters in the experience of the entire series of pictures 
as motion (cf. sign).  
The nine sign aspects can be introduced by a triadic (sub-)classification of the 
sign’s relations. We call the category of a sub-class a categorical aspect, the relation 
between sub-classes of a triad a categorical relation. Below, we introduce a sign 
aspectual characterization of the sign’s primary relations: the relation of the sign to 
itself, to its object, and its interpretant. As a consequence of the dynamical nature of 
successions of sign aspects (cf. steady pictures), we illustrate them by means of signs 
(cf. motion). We designate categories by integers, e.g., firstness by ‘1’, and 
categorical aspects by integers in parentheses, e.g. the aspect of firstness by ‘(1)’.  
 
Figure 16: A Peircean classification of sign aspects (a) and its process interpretation (b). 
In (a), the categorical aspect and category of a sign aspect is designated by a pair of 
integers, e.g., (2)1. In (b), neighboring sign aspects are connected by a horizontal edge. 
The types of interpretation events are depicted on the right-hand side of this diagram, in 
italics 
A classification of sign aspects in triads:  
1. The relation of the sign to itself: (1) qualisign, (2) sinsign, (3) legisign. E.g., the 
perception of pain as (1) a quality, (2) an actual event occurring now, and (3) a 
habitual feeling. 
2. The relation of the sign to its object: (1) iconical, (2) indexical, (3) symbolic. E.g., 
pain interpreted as (1) a measure of a quality, (2) a pointer pointing to the teeth, 
and (3) a conventional concept such as a toothache. 
3. The relation of the sign to its interpretant: (1) rhematic, (2) dicentic or 
propositional, (3) argumentative. E.g., the perception of pain as (1) an abstract 
concept (cf. ‘pain’), (2) an actual existence of ‘pain’ in the teeth, and (3) a premise 
that we should call a dentist. 
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The first triad in the above classification refers to the sign in itself hence to a 
category; the second and third to a relation involved in the sign hence to a categorical 
aspect. On the basis of their category, Peirce’s nine sign aspects can be arranged in a 
partial order (Walther, 1979), (Bense, 1976). See Fig. 16(a). References to sign 
aspects can be given by means of adjectival and nominal phrases that we use 
interchangeably.24  
The isomorphism between the partial order displayed in Fig. 16(b), and the 
cutting plane of the octahedron depicted in Fig. 14 (b), enables the definition of a 
mapping from our informational concepts (cf. Fig. 3) to Peircean sign aspects. For 
example, ‘neutral’ (qualities in themselves) can be mapped to the sign aspect 
qualisign, ‘constituent’ (co-existent qualities) to the sign aspect icon,25 ‘abstraction’ 
(abstract qualia) to the sign aspect rheme. 
6.2  Process model 
In earlier research (Sarbo et al., 2011), we have shown that Peirce’s classification of 
sign aspects can be interpreted as a process of interactions between neighboring sign 
aspects. This is depicted in Fig. 16(b), in which neighboring sign aspects are 
connected by a horizontal edge. 
The input of this process is defined by the input qualia, interpreted as an 
expression of the qualisign sign aspect.26 Through sorting the input into a collection 
of state, and effect qualia, the input qualia are interpreted as an expression of the icon 
and sinsign sign aspects, respectively. By separating the two types of qualia from one 
another, in abstraction, the input qualia are interpreted as an expression of the rheme 
and legisign sign aspects. In complementation, the abstract state and effect is 
augmented with indexical information by the interpreting system, enabling an 
interpretation of the input qualia as an expression of the dicent and symbol sign 
aspects. By merging the last two representations, in predication, the input qualia are 
interpreted as an expression of the argument sign aspect.  
In the next section we delve into an analysis of Peirce’s theory of sign relations 
that themselves are signs, not just sign aspects. Our goal is to reveal the potential of 
our model for an aspectual representation of these more complex notions of the sign 
as well. 
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 In Peircean theory, the kinds of references are used differently. An adjectival reference 
emphasizes the service rendered by the sign aspect, for example, iconic. This is opposed to a 
nominal, which is a reference to a sign, by a pars pro toto use of an aspect, e.g., icon (Van 
Breemen, pers. comm., 2012). 
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 Co-existence involves constituency hence (iconic) resemblance to the input as a whole. 
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 This, and all other expressions by this process are representations of sign aspects involved in the 
input interaction. 
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6.3  The sign as an object 
Arguably the most important property of a process view of sign interpretation is its 
potential for considering the sign to be an object. The possibility of this perspective 
complies with Peirce’s theory of interpretation, as it is pointed out by van Breemen 
(van Breemen, 2012). Peirce writes (Peirce, 1992, 1998):27 
It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; for if 
we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a human 
mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and only after 
that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen if the sign 
addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a 
determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding 
that determination as the sign.  
Peirce classified the significative effect of a sign in three types, which he called 
immediate, dynamic, and final or normal interpretant. His classification indicates a 
development in interpretation as a process (cf. levels), from immediate, through 
dynamic, to final. In this section we suggest that the above levels may apply to the 
apprehension of the sign as an object (‘sign-object’), as well. As, from an analytical 
perspective, the relations involved in triadic signs must be a result of interpretation, 
we must be able to characterize those relations from the perspective of the three 
levels of interpretation. 
Following our assumption of the sign to be an object, the firstness of the relation 
of the sign to itself may be associated with the ‘immediate’ representation (1) of the 
sign (S), (2) the sign of the immediate object (IO) and immediate interpretant (II), 
and (3) the sign of the dynamic object (DO), dynamic interpretant (DI), and final or 
normal interpretant (NI).28 The secondness of representation of the relation of the 
sign to its object may be associated with the more developed, ‘dynamic’ 
representations by the interpreting system: by the relation between the sign and its 
immediate object (cf. S–DO)29 and between the sign and its immediate (cf. S–DI) 
and dynamic interpretant (cf. S–NI), following information augmentation of the IO, 
II, and DI, respectively. Finally, the thirdness of the relation of the sign to its object 
and interpretant may be associated with the relation between the most developed, 
‘final’ representation of the sign, object, and interpretant (cf. S–NI–DO), following a 
(final) information augmentation of the DO and DI.  
An example of firstness sign relations is the phenomenon toothache, signified by 
unsorted qualia of a sensation of pain (S). Via interpretation we may generate a 
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 Vol. 2, p. 391, 1906. 
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 The normal interpretant (NI) is the tendency of the final interpretant towards its limit. In this 
paper the two types of interpretant are used interchangeably. 
29
 Following the above process view of interpretation, S–DO is a representation of the IO, 
following information augmentation mediated by S. 
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thought sign, e.g., ‘toothache’ (II), as a response on the perceived input qualia. By 
sorting the input in a form and event, we may conclude that the perceived qualia 
stand for pain in the dental area (IO). Our first or immediate interpretant may trigger 
more responses such as a motor reaction or an interpreting thought (DI), by means of 
knowledge by the interpreting system (observer). Examples are ‘toothache’, ‘call a 
dentist’, ‘make an appointment’, ‘take an analgesic’, etc., representing increasingly 
more developed responses (DIs) on the input sign. The tendency of these responses 
(NI) can be paraphrased by the interpretant ‘stay calm, do what is necessary, e.g. take 
medication, consult a dentist’. 
We suggest that the above interpretation of the Peircean sign relations (Peirce, 
1865–1909) can be used for the introduction of an aspectual representation of those 
relations. In the next section we show that Peirce’s sign relations can be mapped to 
categorical relations between sign aspects, as well as to relations involved by the 
octahedron structure, including its process interpretation. 
6.4  A representation of sign relations 
The 10 relations of the sign, that are themselves sign, are: S, IO, DO, II, DI, NI, S–
DO, S–DI, S–NI, S–NI–DO. An interpretation of these, more complex notions of the 
sign requires cyclic processing. To this end we make use of a result from (Sarbo et 
al., 2011), proving that processing of a single sign, and a series of signs can be 
modeled in an isomorphic fashion. The cycles enabled by a process, that has three 
types, first or initial, intermediate, and final, can be associated with the three levels 
of interpretation, immediate, dynamic, and final, respectively. Below we revisit our 
process model, depicted in Fig. 16(b), in order to reveal its potential for an aspectual 
representation of the 10 relations of the sign. We refer to sign aspects by means of 
their Peircean term, for example, the qualisign sign aspect by the term ‘qualisign’.  
We begin our analysis with the first event in sign processing, which is the 
definition of the input for processing. As a consequence of the possibility of the sign 
to be an object, the representation of the input by the qualisign sign aspect (S) must 
be an expression of the immediate object of interpretation (IO), as well. See Fig. 17. 
  
Figure 17: Sign relations mapped to categorical relations between sign aspects, and to 
relations between stages of q2*q1. For instance, IO can be mapped to a relation between 
rheme, icon, and qualisign, and to the relation (3)1-(2)1-(1)1 
29 
In sorting, the representation of a relation between the input state and effect, by 
the sinsign sign aspect (S), is also an expression of the event involved in the 
immediate interpretant (II). An expression of the above relation, this time from the 
perspective of constituency, by the icon sign aspect, amounts to a more developed 
expression of the sign-object (IO), as well as a representation of the initial value of 
information augmentation (S-DO). Finally, the representation of the above relation 
by the index sign aspect, as a pointer to complementary information about the input 
state and effect, is also an expression of a development in the process of information 
augmentation, both as a value (S–DO), and an event (II).  
In abstraction, the input sign is represented by the legisign sign aspect, which is 
also an expression of the initial value in the process of information augmentation of 
the habitual relation involved in the input sign (DO). A representation of the input by 
the rheme sign aspect, is an expression of the sign-object as an abstract state (IO). 
This state being the subject of interpretation, the rheme is also an expression of the 
initial value of that process (S–NI). 
In complementation, the representation of the sign-object is augmented from 
immediate to dynamical. This is witnessed by a representation of the sign’s object 
(cf. legisign; DO) and interpretant (cf. rheme; S–NI). If the current processing cycle 
is a final one, the above representation of the interpretant can be used as a 
representation of the final or normal interpretant (S–NI); otherwise, more cycle(s) 
may be required hence that representation must be an expression of the dynamic 
interpretant (S–DI). 
In predication, augmented representations of the sign-object (S–NI, DO) are 
combined into a single representation. This is expressed as the final input 
representation (S–NI–DO), if the current cycle is a final one. If it is not, the above 
representation is offered as input for further processing by the next cycle (S–DI).30 
A mapping of the remaining four relations (DI, S–NI, NI, S–NI–DO) to vertices 
of the octahedron can be defined as follows. If the current cycle is not the final one 
(i.e., further processing is required), the current augmentation of the interpretant (S–
DI) may become a sign-object (cf. qualisign) in the next cycle, in order for a 
generation of the final interpretant (S–NI). Otherwise, the sign-object must involve 
information about a final approximation of the expression of the dynamic 
interpretant. This information can be represented as an abstract ‘state’, by the rheme 
sign aspect (DI), and as a habitual ‘event’, by the legisign sign aspect (NI). The 
process may terminate, by generating a representation of the relation between the 
sign, its object, and interpretant, following (a final) information augmentation (S–
NI–DO).  
According to the above analysis, the relations, DI, S–NI, NI, S–NI–DO, can be 
mapped to a single sign aspect of Peirce’s classification, as well as to a single node 
of the cutting plane of the octahedron. The above mapping can be extended to a 
categorical relation. To this end we observe that, by virtue of the involvement of the 
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 In the S–DI, the DO is involved. 
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above four relations in the information augmentation process, those relations may 
represent properties of the interpreting system itself. We also notice that the 
octahedron may represent relations involved in action–reaction phenomena in three 
ways: as a firstness (cf. ‘action’), a secondness (cf. cutting plane), and a thirdness (cf. 
‘reaction’). From this, we may conclude that a categorical relation of the above four 
notions can be defined by completing their mapping by a first and a third element, 
represented by the nodes ‘action’, and ‘reaction’, respectively. See Fig. 18. 
This completes our analysis of a relation between a Newtonian model of action–
reaction phenomena and Peirce’s theory of signs. Our model is restricted to relational 
interpretation (cf. secondness). A representation of sign interpretation as a firstness, 
and a thirdness are beyond our scope.31  
  
Figure 18: A mapping of DI, S–DI, NI, S–NI–DO, to relations of the octahedron, e.g., 
S–DI is mapped to the relation ‘action’–qualisign–‘reaction’ 
7  Summary 
We suggest that a model of meaningful information processing can be given by 
introducing a model of action–reaction phenomena and embedding it in a Peircean 
theory of signs. Following Peirce, we assume that phenomena, as well as their 
representations by relations can be distinguished in three categories. Peirce 
maintained that from his categories everything else, including his signs and sign 
aspects, can be derived. In this paper we show that our model has the potential of 
representing three types of relation, consisting of 10, 28, and 66 elements, that are 
analogous to Peirce’s three classifications of signs. This implies the possibility of a 
common representation for Peirce’s different classifications. Peirce’s sign theory is 
considered by many to be a theory of the knowable (the types of distinction that can 
be signified by signs). By virtue of the above relation with Peircean semiotics, and 
because of the fundamental nature of signs, our approach has the potential for a 
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 Through representing the relation involved in firstness and thirdness, by a single node, the 
octahedron may be conceived to be a representation of the lattice multiplication q3*q2*q1. 
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uniform modeling of information processing in any domain, theoretically. Past 
research in natural language processing, ‘naive’ logic and ‘naive’ reasoning has 
shown that the above hypothesis may hold, and that the developed models may be 
practical as well.  
Acknowledgments 
We thank Rein Cozijn, Auke van Breemen and Arjen Hommersom for proof reading 
the paper, and Cafe Jos for the ambiance. 
 
References 
Adriaans, P. (2009). Between order and chaos: The quest for meaningful 
information. Theory of Computing Systems., 650–674. 
Adriaans, P., Allo, P., C, B., Primiero, G., Rovan, B., Sarbo, J., et al. (2010). Philo- 
 sophical aspects of the foundations of models of information. In J. Seligman 
 (Ed.), Workshop on the philosophy of the information and computing 
sciences. Leiden (The Netherlands): Lorentz Center. 
Barr, M., & Wells, C. (1990). Category theory for computing science. Prentice-Hall. 
Bense, M. (1976). Das System der Theoretischen Semiotik. Semiosis(1), 24–28. 
Birkhoff, G., & Bartee, T. (1970). Modern applied algebra. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Burch, R. (2011). Peirces 10, 28, and 66 sign-types: The simplest mathematics. 
 Semiotica, 184 (1/4), 93–98. 
Davey, B., & Priestley, H. (1990). Introduction to lattices and order. Cambridge 
 University Press. 
Farias, P., & Queiroz, J. (2003). On diagrams for peirces 10, 28, and 66 classes of 
signs. Semiotica, 147 (1/4), 165–184. 
Harnad, S. (1987). Categorical Perception: The groundwork of cognition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCarthy, J., & Hayes, P. (1969). Some philosophical problems from the standpoint 
of artificial intelligence. In B. Meltzer & D. Michie (Eds.), Machine 
intelligence 4 (pp. 463–502). Edinburgh University Press. 
Newton, I. (1999/1687). The Principia. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Peirce, C. (1865–1909). Logic Notebook. Houghton Library, Harvard university: 
 Unpublished manuscript on microfilm. 
32 
Peirce, C. (1932). Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge: Harvard 
 University Press. 
Peirce, C. (1992, 1998). The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, 2 
 volumes. Bloomington: Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press. 
Sanders, G. (1970). Peirce’s sixty-six signs? Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 
 Society, 6 (1), 3–16. 
Sarbo, J. (1996). Lattice embedding. In P. Eklund, G. Ellis, & G. Mann (Eds.), 
Conceptual structures: Knowledge representation as interlingua (ICCS’96) 
(Vol. 1115, pp. 293–307). 
Sarbo, J., Farkas, J., & van Breemen, A. (2011). Knowledge in Formation: A 
Computational Theory of Interpretation. Berlin: Springer (eBook: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17089-8). 
van Breemen, A. (2012). Knowledge in Formation: The Peircean, semiotic 
background.  Radboud University Nijmegen: PhD Thesis (forthcoming). 
Vitanyi, P. (2006). Meaningful information. IEEE Transactions on Information 
Theory, 52 (10), 4617–4626. 
Walther, E. (1979).  llge eine  eic enle re:  in   rung in die  rundlagen de 
Semiotik. Stuttgart: Deutche Verlags-Anstalt. 
Weiss, P., & Burks, A. (1945). Peirce’s sixty-six signs. The Journal of Philosophy, 
42 (14), 383–388. 
 
 
